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As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the world credit markets stalled significantly 
and raised the doubts of market participants and policymakers about the proper and 
fair valuation of financial derivatives and structured products such as collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs). The aim of the paper is to contribute to the understanding 
of CDOs and shed light on CDO valuation based on data before and during the 
current financial upheaval. We present the One Factor Model based on a Gaussian 
Copula and test five hypothesizes. Based on the results we discovered four main 
deficiencies of the CDO market. For our modelling we used data of the CDX NA IG 
5Y V3 index from 20 September 2007 until 27 February 2009 and its quotes we 
appropriately transform into CDO quotes. Based on the results we discovered four 
main deficiencies of the CDO market: i) an insufficient analysis of underlying assets 
by both investors and rating agencies; ii) the valuation model was usually based only 
on expected cash-flows when neglecting other factors such mark-to-market losses or 
correlation risk; iii) mispriced correlation; and finally  iv) the mark-to-market 
valuation obligation for financial institutions should be reviewed. Based on the 
mentioned recommendations we conclude that the CDO market has a chance to be 
regenerated. However, the future CDO market would then be more conscious, 
driven by smarter motives rather than by poor understanding of risks involved in 
CDOs.   
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1.  Introduction 
By 2007, mounting defaults in the US sub-prime mortgage market led to US market 
instability, unleashing a global fiscal contagion that spread around the world, roiling markets 
and causing world economic upheaval. This contagion led to, for example, the nationalization 
of big financial institutions, bank failures, the end of an era in investment banking, increased 
federal insurance on banking deposits, government bailouts and opportunistic investments by 
sovereign wealth funds (Teply,2009). Consequently, the world credit markets stalled 
significantly and raised the doubts of market participants and policymakers about the proper 
and fair valuation of financial derivatives and structured products such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs).  
A CDO is a credit-based derivative structured product which enables a transfer of a 
credit risk of a portfolio of assets from its issuer (protection seller) to an investor (protection 
buyer). CDOs employ securitization technology to pool assets and finance the purchase of 
those assets by the issuance of securities (Fabozzi and Kothari,2008). Some types of CDOs, 
and CDOs of underlying CDOs (CDO
-) can be conceived as a form of insurance against a 
credit event of any of the underlying assets.  
The aim of the paper is to contribute to the understanding of CDOs and shed light on 
CDO valuation based on data before and during the current financial upheaval. In our research 
we expand previous empirical and theoretical papers on CDO valuation (Bhansali et al. 
(2008), Longstaff and Rajan (2008), Scheicher (2008) or Tarashev and Zhu (2007)). Since 
CDOs rank among the more advanced structured products, the models used for their valuation 
are very complex and therefore investors often relied on assessment of rating agencies without 
a proper understanding of the model. After explaining the valuation model in context of the 
pending turmoil, we will be able to specify and demonstrate recent weaknesses of the CDO 
market and provide recommendations for the future existence and regulation of CDO markets. 
This paper is organized as follows: after a brief introduction, we describe basic principles of 
CDOs. In section three we present the one factor Gaussian copula model. Although it is a 
relatively simple model, which does not demand sophisticated mathematical and probability 
methods, it is understandable, straightforward and suitably illustrates the main sensitivities 
and key features of CDO valuation. The second part of this section develops the theoretical 
concept presented in the third section and explains the CDO valuation process when using the 
VBA program in MS Excel. In the fourth section, we test five hypothesizes related to CDO 
valuation models before the crisis. Based on the outcomes, we detect main flaws of the CDO 
valuation and make relevant recommendations that should help to restore confidence of the 
CDO market. Finally, in conclusion, we summarize the paper and state final remarks. 
2.  Basic Principles of CDOs 
2.1   CDO basics 
There is no unique definition of a CDO as it is a complex financial product which 
might take several forms (Figure 1). For instance, IMF (2008) offers the following definition 
of a typical CDO: “A structured credit security backed by a pool of securities, loans, or credit 
default swaps, where securitized interests in the security are divided into tranches with 
differing repayment and interest earning streams.” We can distinguish among various CDOs 
according to a variety of criteria such as mode of assets acquisition (cash, synthetic, hybrid),   Page 2 
underlying assets (high-yield, investment grade, emerging market,  primary market, CDO 
squared), purpose (balance sheet, arbitrage), leverage structure (cash-flow, market value) or 
asset ramping (fully, partly, to be ramped up), asset management (static, managed) – for more 
details see Fabozzi et al. (2008),  Fabozzi  and  Kothari (2008)  or Mejstrik et al. (2008).  
Collectively, the unifying factor is that once structured, the resulting instrument is assigned a 
rating by the rating agencies that stands as a proxy for the instrument’s credibility under 
normal circumstances. 
Figure 1: CDOs as part of complex structured finance products 
  
Source: IMF (2008)   
Note: ABS = asset-backed security; MBS = mortgage-backed security; RMBS = residential mortgage-backed 
security; CMBS = commercial mortgage-backed security; CDS = credit default swap; and CDOs = collateralized 
debt obligations. Not proportionally representative. 
Although CDOs were first presented in 1980s, their issuance registered an outstanding 
growth since 2001 when most CDOs received a rating as the rating agencies became more 
familiar with CDOs (Fabozzi et al., 2008). In 2004 the worldwide CDO issuance amounted to 
USD 97 billion and peaked in 2006 when it totaled USD 445 billion. As a result of the 
financial turmoil, the CDO issuance plummeted to mere USD 156 billion in 2008. Figure 2 
demonstrates that structured CDOs (synthetic CDOs based on credit default swaps and/or 
CDOs squared) were the main source of CDO growth in the 2001-2008 period. The issuance 
of structured CDOs jumped from USD 12 billion in 2001 to USD 240 billion in 2006 and fell 
back to USD 26 billion in 2008. As of the end of 2008, total CDO outstanding amounted to 
USD 870 billion. 
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The high growth in CDO activity in 2005 and 2006 was mainly due to arbitrage 
activity (i.e. profit motives) that replaced credit risk elimination (the initial motive of CDO 
issuance). The highest tranches often obtained the highest possible score from rating agencies 
and therefore were wrongly considered a safe investment (Teply and Cernohorsky, 2009). 
However, as a result of the US mortgage crisis in 2007, the issuance of CDOs fell 
dramatically and the premiums the issuers were willing to pay for credit protection 
skyrocketed. As of October 2008 the CDO market was frozen and 67% of the CDOs issued 
since late 2005 to middle 2007 were in formal state of default (Thomson Reuters, 2008). The 
problems with the CDO market started when mortgage backed securities’ investors suffered 
losses. Since many CDOs were linked owned by  these investors, their tranches were 
downgraded and a spiral of losses was then created, exacerbated by diminishing liquidity. 
Downgrades of CDO tranches triggered losses of CDO investors and since many CDOs were 
linked issued by to these investors, further CDO tranches had to be downgraded causing 
further losses and write-downs. As a result of mark-to-market cuts, total writedowns by banks 
and other financial institutions between mid-2007 and May 2009 are estimated at USD 685 
billion (Asset-Backed Alert, 2009). Many institutional investors suffered massive  write-
downs (e.g. Citigroup, UBS or KBC), many of them were bailed-out (e.g. AIG, Royal Bank 
of Scotland or Northern Rock), while some were acquired by a stronger competitor (e.g. Bear 
Stearns, Merrill Lynch or Washington Mutual).   
In our paper we present and discuss a model for an arbitrage cash CDO. In a cash 
CDO, the assets are purchased by the CDO originator (in contrast to a synthetic CDO, where 
the originator does not buy the underlying assets but has an exposure to the assets through 
credit derivatives). Under arbitrage CDO scheme, the originator makes profit on spread 
between the return earned on the pool of assets that is the collateral for the CDO and funding 
costs of the CDO. An arbitrage cash CDO is a combination of the types mentioned above 
(“Model CDO”). The Model CDO can be understood as a type of insurance against default as 
it is a contract between an originator and an investor with specified maturity in which the 
originator commits to pay the investor regular premium payment until maturity. The investor 
in exchange promises to bear all the credit risk (all the principal risk in the event of a default). 
In the case of no default until maturity, the originator continues to regularly pay the investor 
the premium. In case of default until maturity, the investor compensates the originator the loss 
the originator suffered. 
Moreover, the Model CDO represents a very diverse risk structure product. It offers 
the investor to choose the amount of credit risk he would absorb based on his risk profile and 
appetite. This feature lies in CDO tranching. The basic principle of the Model CDO is 
depicted on Figure 3. Imagine an underlying portfolio of 100 securities with the same nominal 
value. The Model CDO is divided into four tranches each absorbing a portion of the resulting 
cash flows or default impact; the first tranche receives the first flows and the remainder flows 
or “cascades” to the lower tranches.  The investor of a first tranche receives the first impact, 
i.e. immediately when a first default occurs. He compensates the originator for first 5 percent 
of defaults. The second tranche investor does not have to make any loss payment to the 
originator in case of no more than 5 defaults (his tranche is not hit - he compensates the losses 
of more than five and less than 16 defaults). The same principle holds for higher tranches: 








Figure 3: Arbitrage Cash CDO 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations   
The higher the risk, the higher the premium received from the originator. Instead of 
investing in the whole portfolio yielding 6.8% to maturity, the structure allows the investor to 
choose a specified tranche with much more concrete risk profile and corresponding return. 
2.2       CDO indices 
CDOs rank equivalent to an over the counter (OTC) products and hence no official 
exchange exist. CDO indices were established during times of high CDO trade volume to 
achieve standardization in CDO  trading.  At present, there are two main groups of CDO 
indices: i) CDX and ii) iTraxx. CDX contains North American companies’ names and was 
established by CDS Index Company and marketed by Markit Group Limited. On the other 
hand,  iTraxx contains European and Asian companies’ names and it was introduced by 
International Index Company. iTraxx is therefore divided into iTraxx Europe and iTraxx Asia. 
In 2007 Markit Group acquired CDS Index Company and International Index Company, thus 
it now manages both the CDX and iTraxx8 (see www.markit.com). 
In our paper we use the CDX index data for our analysis. There are many advantages 
of using the CDX index  compared to a single CDO  for reasons such as diversification, 
transparency, standardization and liquidity that guarantees lower bid-offer spreads. Unlike a 
single CDO, the index provides a possibility to invest only in a selected geographical area or 
business sector. By investing in a tranche of an index, CDO investors can establish proxy 
hedges against the CDO tranches they hold. Index trades are also used to take positions and 
express outlook of credit markets. Indices are also widely used as a benchmark for credit risk 
assessment. Figure 4 shows an evolution of the CDX IG 5Y Series 3 index since 2004 and 
clearly reveals two main events on credit markets in the year 2008: Bear Stearns’ bankruptcy 
in March 2008 and Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. However, high values of 
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Figure 4: CDX IG 5Y index Series 3 (September 2004 – February 2009) 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
2.3    CDO risks 
As each financial instrument, a CDO bears many risks for the investor such as interest 
rate risk, cross-currency risk, ramp-up risk and reinvestment risk (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008); 
we  will focus on  the following two: i) correlation risk and ii) counterparty risk.  By a 
correlation we mean the correlation between the defaults of underlying assets of a CDO. The 
higher the correlation, the more fragile the whole CDO structure. The role of correlation can 
be described using an example of a ferry (representing senior tranche) and a small wooden 
boat (representing an equity tranche) crossing  a mine field. The ferry is destroyed after 
crossing ten mines whereas the boat is destroyed by one mine. Suppose there is a constant 
number of mines but they are differently distributed over the field. First, they are evenly 
distributed (i.e. no correlation), second, they all are in one small area whereas the rest of the 
field is mine free (i.e. high correlation). The probability that the ferry is destroyed is higher in 
case of high correlation of mines because in case of no correlation it wouldn’t cross more than 
9 mines. Therefore the senior tranche holder requires higher premium in case of high 
correlation of the default times. On the other hand, if there is no correlation the boat has 
nearly no chance of surviving compared to the high correlation and therefore the higher the 
correlation the lower the premium for an equity tranche. The correlation changes over time 
and depends on macroeconomic conditions. In times of a recession the correlation between 
assets tends to increase, whereas it is low in times of growth (Kakodkar, A. et al., 2003). This 
is a very important feature which is essential to understand when investing in a CDO. 
Correlation will be discussed in much more details in the following sections. 
A CDO investor is subject to a counterparty risk of both a CDO issuer and all 
underlying assets’ issuers. Usually, each CDO tranche is classified by a rating. This rating, 
however, can theoretically be reviewed and changed by a rating agency at any time (although 
the rating agencies failed to exercise this option until too late during the crisis). In previous 
years the rating agencies’ assessment of risk was taken as gospel by all its users and they 
acted as if the rating was once given and irreversible. In fact, a default of one underlying asset 
can cause a downgrade of all tranches of a CDO. Consequently, not only a junior tranche   Page 6 
investor is hit by the default but also a senior tranche investor suffers a loss – a mark-to-
market loss - as the spread of the senior tranche soars. This happened in the crisis and that is 
why CDOs are often labeled  as the main cause of the unthought-of losses resulting in 
numerous defaults or financial difficulties of often large and stable companies and financial 
institutions. The threat of downgrading  of an asset and all its consequences based on 
numerical evidence will be further discussed in the fifth section. 
Figure 5 illustrates the above explained risks and their consequences. On a right x-axis 
we it depicts institutions that issued more than USD 10 billion nominal of CDOs in the most 
successful year 2006. Merrill Lynch ranked  the first with USD  54 billion,  followed by 
Deutsche Bank with USD 35 billion and Citigroup with USD 33 billion CDO issuance. 
Figure 5: Top CDO issuers and their writedowns as of February 2009 (in USD millions) 
 
Source: Authors based on www.abalert.com 
The columns in Figure 5 show the writedowns of the institutions since mid 2007 until 
February 2009. Citigroup with nearly USD 60 billion of writedowns was on the first place 
followed by Merrill Lynch and UBS. These writedowns have their roots in a high volume of 
subprime mortgages offered recklessly to households with a low credibility in the US. The 
mortgages were  securitized into a mortgage backed securities (MBS) and then  sold to 
institutional investors. In this way the credit risk of the mortgages was spread to the whole 
financial sector. After some mortgage defaults, many institutions involved in this process 
were hit and some of them even defaulted (such as Lehman Brothers or US mortgage agencies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). These defaults triggered first settlements of CDO contracts, 
downgrades of MBS holders, consecutive downgrades of CDO holders and massive 
writedowns of many counterparties included in MBS or CDO business. This also resulted in 
CDS spreads widening and further mark-to-market losses. Some CDOs had to be terminated 
before maturity creating even higher losses. Because of high interdependence within a 
financial sector and its strong link to all business sectors, a series of problems of underlying 
companies led to a serious financial crisis the world is now experiencing.   
3.  The One Factor Gaussian Copula Model and its Implementation  
3.1   The One Factor Gaussian Copula Model 
The One Factor Gaussian Copula Model is a basic model of a CDO valuation and based 
on a principle of correlation of default times firstly introduced by Li, 2000:3. The main idea 
behind all CDO valuation models lies in setting the spread of a tranche (i.e. such premium 
that ensures the present value of premium payments equals to the present value of the loss 
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payment and the premium payment depend on a number of defaults in the future and their 
timing, which further determines a time distribution of loss. As none of this is known, losses 
are random variables whose expected value should be computed within the model. First, we 
should determine the probability of default of an obligor by time t. Then, having this 
distribution for each obligor and combining it with a correlation structure between the 
obligors, we identify the joint distribution function. The factor model enables to solve the 
problem with a correlation structure between obligors. The copula function approach 
introduces a e quantitative way how to cope with multidimensional distribution functions. 
After obtaining the joint distribution, it is straightforward to deduce the probability of number 
of defaults in each time period and the loss distribution. The model can be extended either by 
using multiple factors instead of one (Hull and White, 2004: 6), by assuming other than 
normal distribution of default times (Gregory and Laurent,  2004:  5)  or by modifying 
assumptions of entry parameters such as recovery rate or correlation (Wang, Rachev and 
Fabozzi, 2006:19 or Krekel, 2008:4). 
It is worth noting here that the abovementioned papers were written dealing with 
relatively many simplifying assumptions and improving the valuation from a mathematical 
point of view. But no one really predicted much more devastating consequences of several 
defaults after inclusion of a market insight (e.g. the liquidity risk or increased risk aversion of 
the markets).    
Suppose a CDO with n underlying assets  . Using One factor Gaussian copula 
model our task is to set the premium payment V  for each tranche so that the present value of 
premium payments equals to the present value of loss payments. Such premium   satisfies: 
 
where    is a discount factor discounting from time    ,    to   
( , thus  ,  where    is a spot 
forward interest rate. 
To determine optimal premium V
* we need the expected loss function   
which is given by equation (2): 
 
  and   define tranches, i.e. an attachment resp. detachment point of a tranche. We 
suppose the same volume of each underlying asset in the CDO pool and denote it A.   is 
a cumulative loss on the whole portfolio by time   given    defaults. To put it simply, to 
reach    we count loss on a tranche for all cases of    defaults 
and sum them weighted by their probability  . As other 
parameters of equation (2) are known, only the probability of  j  defaults by time  
 is to be determined.  
Therefore a random variable   is introduced denoting a default time of i-th underlying 
asset,  . It is essential for our calculation to deduce its properties. 
The derivation is not straightforward; we divide it in two steps. In the first step we 
condition the probability on one factor M which is supposed to be normally distributed:   Page 8 
 
where   is a random variable with standard normal distribution,  . In One 
factor model   and M are independent. Therefore also   is a random variable with normal 
distribution.  is a constant called loading factor,  . Based on copula approach there is 
a link between   and  . For a fixed i suppose   is a distribution function of   and   
is a distribution function of  . If    is increasing, then there exists bilaterally unique 
correspondence between   and  1 such that: 
 
 
s are mapped to   using a percentile-to-percentile transformation. 
From now on  we suppose a homogenous portfolio –  i.e. the default times of all 
obligors have the same distribution -    for all   and correlation among the 
default times is the same for each pair of obligors -    for all  . The number of 
defaults at time t   follows a binomial distribution, therefore:  
 
where    is derived from equation (6) using One Factor Gaussian 
Copula approach. 
 
The reason for conditioning in the first step is that based on the theory of copulas, the 
default times of obligors are mutually independent only conditionally on a factor value. Only 
having independent default times the binomial distribution in equation (5) can be used. 
In the second step using integral over all M we derive the unconditional probability: 
 
Given the mathematical background, in the following section  we will present the 
valuation program we designed in the VBA program in MS Excel. Consequently parameters 
of the model will be chosen appropriately given recent improvements  in CDO pricing. 
Finally, we will value the CDX index and its tranches, implement comparative statistics and 
assess sensitivity on each parameter in context with the current financial crisis.  
3.2       Implementation of CDO valuation 
In this section we will show how to implement the valuation of a CDO contract 
following the theoretical concept introduced in the previous part. All market data have been 
taken from Bloomberg. To implement the valuation it is necessary to adopt some assumptions 
about the entry parameters. The main is the distribution of   and pairwise correlation  . 
                                                 
1 D is a standard notation of the definition scope   Page 9 
One useful measure of probability distribution of   is hazard rate function  defined 
e.g. in Li (2000): 
 
where   is the distribution function of and is   the density of the default times. 
After some basic derivations we obtain: 
 
We suppose that the hazard rate function is constant at some level called hazard rate 
and denoted by λ. Based on this assumption the density of the default time simplifies to an 
exponential one: 
 
Hazard rate of an asset is then deduced from the market quotes of credit default swap 
(CDS). 
Concerning correlation, the correlation parameter is defined as a loading factor in the 
One factor model in equation (3). We suppose that correlation is the same for each pair of 
assets. There are two approaches to correlation determination: implied correlation and base 
correlation. In both approaches the correlation is determined endogenously by the model. 
Implied correlation is defined as a correlation for which the net present value of a tranche 
equals zero. The base correlation approach is more complex. Suppose a CDX index with 
following tranching: (0-3)%, (3-7)%, (7-10)%, (10-15)% and (15-30)%. Now imagine a non-
existing series of tranches (0-7)%, (0-10)%, (0-15)% and (0-30)%. Implied correlation is a 
value of correlation that sets the non-existing tranches’ values to zero.  
Theoretically, the implied and base correlation should be the same for all tranches and 
subsets of tranches. The discussion of values of correlation in imperfect markets will follow. 
Generally, it is observed that it differs through tranches and even through time - it tends to be 
lower in economic upturns rather than in downturns. For more discussion of correlation see 
Das (2005) or (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008).  
4.  Results of The Model 
The aim of this section is to illustrate CDO pricing when using the model presented in 
section 3.1 based on assumptions taken in section 3.2. We run the calculation introduced 
above to show market risk of a CDO and to model the mark-to-market loss of a holder of 
senior tranches  (i.e.  we  demonstrate what were  the consequences of massive  and  naïve 
investment in AAA rated tranches and why the CDO market nearly ceased to exist). At the 
beginning of this section we briefly discuss the data used for our research. 
4.1       Data used 
As we discussed above, the volume of CDO trades fell dramatically in 2008 after 
years of growth and the liquidity of the market disappeared. CDS index valuation will be 
implemented due to both difficulties to get market data and low level of liquidity of CDOs. 
We choose the most traded series of the main CDX index – 9 and maturity – 5 years (usually 
noted as CDX NA IG 5Y V3). This index originally counted 125 underlying bonds issued by 
North American companies. The effective date of the index was on 20 September 2007. Since 
then there have been 3 defaults of underlying companies (Federal Home Loan Mortgage   Page 10 
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association and Washington Mutual). After each 
event of default a new version of the index had to be launched so that new index investors had 
a starting position with no defaults and continuity of the index was sustained. First two 
defaults were settled at once, therefore a third version of this index was introduced in trading 
nowadays (named as the CDX.NA.IG S9 5Y Version 3).  
Figure 6 shows the first CDX index (version 1) for the period from 20 September 2009 
until November 2008 and describes reactions of an index to an announcement of defaults 
were enormous. For instance, the first version premium was decreasing since its issue date. 
While the index started trading at 30 bps, it reached 148 bps as of 5 September 2008. On 8 
September  2008 the Federal Housing Finance Agency  announced it  put  Fannie Mae  and 
Freddie Mac under its conservatorship, which was considered as a credit event. Moreover, 
Washington Mutual nationalization was announced two weeks later. As a result, after the 
auction and settlement of the defaults the market quote skyrocketed to 3,000 bps in late 
November 2008.  
Figure 6: The development of the CDX.NA.IG S9 5Y Version 1 from 20 September 2009 
until November 2008 
 
4.2   Hypotheses Testing 
The section consists of three parts: in the first part, we determine a relation of each 
tranche’s premium to correlation, hazard rate and event of default. In the second part we show 
these implications on recent data. As we have data of an index instead of a CDO, we estimate 
how a real CDO would have  behaved  in two  recent  years, which were affected by the 
financial crisis. The last part  deals with  an overall assessment of the CDO market, its 
weaknesses, role in the crisis and contribution to the crisis. The main flaws of the market are 
spotted and their correction is proposed. Moreover we test five hypothesizes about the entry 
parameters. The Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 concerns correlation within the CDO model, the 
Hypothesis 4 deals with hazard rate and Hypothesis 5 raises the issue of mark-to-market 
valuation. 
4.2.1. Correlation Evaluation (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) 
A correlation parameter shows the correlation between each pair of underlying assets. 
Figure 7 shows what the role of correlation in each tranche. We fixed the hazard rate at 0.07 
and calculated the premium of a tranche for a varying level of correlation on vertical axis.  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the asset correlation, the lower the risk premium for a junior tranche 
and the higher the risk premium for a senior tranche. 





Figure 7: Tranche premium for a given level of correlation (as of 28 February 2009) 
 
For the most junior tranche (0-3%) the premium is a decreasing function of correlation 
whereas for the most senior tranche the premium increases with correlation. The mezzanine 
tranches are less sensitive to correlation. Moreover,  the relation between correlation and 
premium does not always have to be monotonic (see results for the 15-30% tranche). Higher 




















































































































































































































































Tranche 30-100%  Page 12 
willing to pay less to the protection buyer. The opposite holds for the senior tranches investors 
for whom higher correlation has a higher value. To conclude, Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. 
For proper CDO valuation we need to determine the level of correlation. First, we will use the 
implied correlation. See Table 1 for the results of the valuation based on different values of 
correlation. In the first row there is a market quote of CDX tranches on 28 February 2009. For 
the three lowest tranches the values displayed are already recalculated to the upfront payment 
quotes. Market quote of the tranche is also incorporated in Figure 7 by a light green line and 
its intersection point with the blue line determines the implied correlation. 
Table 1: Results of valuation on 28 February 2009 with hazard rate of 0.07 
 





28/2/2009  81.72%  53.85%  22.97%  7.72%  1.14%  0.50% 
correlation             
0.00  98.02%  92.86%  86.68%  23.45%  1.08%  0.00% 
0.05  97.46%  90.37%  75.91%  20.07%  2.85%  0.00% 
0.10  96.59%  85.87%  67.40%  18.76%  4.00%  2.00% 
0.15  95.21%  80.89%  61.18%  17.91%  4.85%  0.06% 
0.20  93.28%  76.01%  56.34%  17.24%  5.51%  0.12% 
0.25  90.88%  71.39%  52.34%  16.67%  6.03%  0.20% 
0.30  88.08%  67.03%  44.91%  16.15%  6.45%  0.28% 
0.35  84.95%  62.98%  45.88%  15.66%  6.80%  0.37% 
0.40  81.54%  59.12%  43.12%  15.19%  7.09%  0.47% 
0.45  77.87%  55.44%  40.56%  14.73%  7.33%  0.58% 
0.50  73.98%  51.89%  38.15%  14.28%  7.53%  0.69% 
0.55  69.87%  48.45%  35.84%  13.82%  7.70%  0.80% 
0.60  65.53%  45.07%  33.59%  13.36%  7.82%  0.92% 
0.65  60.97%  41.72%  31.36%  12.90%  7.93%  1.05% 
0.70  56.15%  38.36%  29.13%  12.41%  8.00%  1.19% 
0.75  51.02%  34.94%  26.79%  11.90%  8.05%  1.34% 
0.80  45.52%  31.40%  24.34%  11.34%  8.08%  1.51% 
0.85  39.46%  27.51%  22.10%  10.66%  8.07%  1.69% 
0.90  32.68%  22.44%  18.82%  9.99%  7.98%  1.92% 
0.95  24.52%  17.62%  15.12%  9.54%  7.67%  2.22% 
0.99  15.30%  12.67%  8.71%  7.51%  7.41%  2.64% 
Implied 
correlation  0.4  0.5  0.85  0.99  0.0  0.4 
 
Table  1  displays that the correlation differs substantially among tranches. The 
difference between implied correlations is a usual outcome of CDO valuation models (Hull 
and White (2004) or Amato and Gyntelberg (2005)). This is sometimes called “correlation 
smile” and points to both imperfection of the model and the fact that market quotes comprise 
other factors that are not included in the model. In our case the variation is significant, what 
was due to the financial crisis and false market valuation.    Page 13 
Market conditions have  changed substantially since 20 September 2007, when  the 
CDOs trading was relatively low. Figure 8 compares implied correlation of tranches on 28 
February 2009 and 20 September 2007 and demonstrates that implied correlation was more 
stable through tranches in   September 2007. Therefore we conclude that distressed markets 
and inappropriate valuation of tranches caused current huge variations of implied correlation 
among tranches in February 2009. 





Hypothesis 2: Base correlation is more stable measure of correlation than implied correlation. 
Figure  9  depicts, base correlation recorded  less variance than the implied 
correlation as of 28 February 2009. To illustrate this, suppose an investment in all tranches of 
a CDO totaling USD 1 million. The distribution of the notional among tranches is given by 
their attachment and detachment points (e.g. we invest USD 30,000 in equity tranche, USD 
40,000 in 3-7% tranche etc.).  
First we start with the equity tranche where the base correlation equals the implied 
correlation, then we need to evaluate the base correlation for the two lowest tranches. Taking 
correlation of 0.4 the present value of the 0-3% tranche equals 0 and present value of the 3-
7% tranche is negative. Both these tranches’ premiums are decreasing in correlation (see 
Figure 7). Therefore, we run the calculation with a higher value of correlation given market 
quotes increases the present value of both tranches. With the correlation of 0.44 and we obtain 
the present value of the 0-3% tranche worth USD  +3,200 and the present value of the 3-7% 
tranche worth USD -3,200. Therefore 0.44 is the base correlation for the two lowest tranches.  
Figure 9: Base and implied correlation for tranches on 28 February 2009 
 
However, the concept of base correlation is not that intuitive as it seems to be. To 
illustrate it, we show how the correlation is appointed for the 15-30% tranche. Figure 7 shows 








































































base correlation  Page 14 
to increase while adding more senior tranches up to the detachment point 15%. Then, after 
arriving at correlation of 0.56, we add the 15-30% tranche which has a premium increasing in 
correlation. Now it depends on its implied correlation which determines its present value.  
Figure 9 depicts that as of 28 February 2009 the implied correlation is approaching 0 thus for 
the  correlation  of  0.56 the present value of the tranche is deeply  negative. Decreasing 
correlation leads to an increase of the present value of the 15-30% tranche from negative 
values but also to a decrease of all more junior tranches’ present values from positive values. 
On the other hand, increasing correlation would decrease present value of the 15-30% tranche 
to more negative values but it also increases the present value of other tranches. Now, it 
depends on the sensitivity of the tranches to correlation and on the width of the tranches 
which effect would be stronger and lead to a 0 sum of present values. Finally, we conclude 
that it would be the case of an increase in correlation. The base correlation is therefore 
monotonically increasing in correlation  and more stable than the implied correlation.  In 
conclusion, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
In case of a standard CDO, the most senior tranche (30-100%) is not sold to protection 
sellers and is usually retained by the issuer and therefore not included into our calculations. 
Hypothesis 3: Correlation and hazard rate changed substantially between 20 September 2007 
and 28 February 2009  
Figure  10  shows the evolution of base correlation  during the financial crisis  and clearly 
demonstrates that the base correlation changed in the observed period. As a result, the first 
part of Hypothesis 3 concerning the correlation cannot be rejected. Neither the second part of 
the hypothesis regarding the hazard rate can be rejected as detailed discussed in section 4.2.2.  
Figure 10: Base correlation of tranches on 28 February 2009 and 20 September 2007 
 
4.2.2. Hazard Rate and Tranche Premium Evaluation (Hypothesis 4) 
Hazard rate for an asset is calculated from the CDO quote and recovery rate. Higher 
premium of a CDO implies to a higher credit risk of an asset. The premium of any CDO 
tranche based on a pool of assets also increases. Higher recovery rate adverts to lower loss 
given default and therefore the premium of a CDO tranche would be lower (Figure 11). We 
assume constant correlation of 0.4. 











































Figure 11: Tranche’s premium with respect to a hazard rate on 28 February 2009 
 
 
Figure 11 displays that the higher the seniority of the tranche, the more convex the 
relation between the premium and hazard rates. The higher the hazard rate, the higher the 
compensation in form of tranche’s premium has to be to offset increased credit risk. 
Accordingly, the mark-to-market loss on the senior tranche in case of an increase of hazard 
rate has to be expected higher for higher starting level of the  hazard rate. As a result, 
Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected. 
4.2.3  Loss Evaluation (Hypothesis 5) 
We already mentioned that an expressive increase of credit risk during the financial 
upheaval. The premiums of the tranches often multiplied in the crisis even despite the fact that 
after each default the index was recalculated. In this part, we will transform the CDX to a 
CDO, i.e. we will abolish the feature of the new version of the index following each default. 
The loss after a default can be separated to three parts according to a consequence of: i) 
increased perception of credit risk; ii) new definition of tranche attachment and detachment 
point and iii) settlement of the defaulted asset. The first part points to a pure increase of fear 
on the market. Numerically it is expressed by an increase of hazard rate and correlation 
between assets. The second part of the loss is numerically  expressed by a decrease of 
underlying assets with a fixed volume and decrease of attachment and detachment points’ 
absolute values by the notional of the defaulted assets, both with fixed hazard rate and 
correlation. The third part of the loss bears only one tranche depending on sequences of the 
default.  
Hypothesis 5: There has been a substantial loss even on the most senior tranche without a 
necessity to be hit directly by a default of this tranche. 
In our calculation we suppose a CDO tranche buyer who entered the CDO contract on 
20 September 2007 and hold the CDO until 28 February 2009. This implies that his CDO 
suffered three defaults during its life. Our task is to evaluate his loss on 28 February 2009 
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on expected cash-flows. First, we evaluate the CDO as of the issue date. Consequently, we 
evaluate it on the valuation date with new parameters (Table 2). 
 
 
Table  2:  Changes  in parameters of the model between  28  February  2009  and  20 
September 2007 
 
20.9.2007  28.2.2009 
Correlation  0.32  0.44 
Hazard rate  0.01  0.07 
Number of assets  125  122 
Notional invested  USD 100 mil.   USD 97.6 mil. 
AP and DP 
 
-2.4 percentage points 
Note: AP = attachment point, DP = attachment point  
The hazard rate was deduced from the CDO spreads of the underlying assets based on 
0.39 recovery rate and it has increased seven times since autumn 2008. Therefore Hypothesis 
3 cannot be rejected. The correlation is set as an average base correlation for three lowest 
tranches (Table 3). 
Table 3: Mark-to-Market loss on a CDO tranche on 28/2/09 with 10 M USD initial 
investment 
 
We should note that what we call the mark-to-market loss is in fact the loss based on 
changed values of expected cash-flows (i.e. the loss based on mark-to-market change of entry 
parameters, then the tranches are still valued by the model). The real mark-to-market loss 
would have to be derived from the market value of an instrument based on the fair value 
accounting principle. There are no available market data to a particular CDO but we can 
deduce from Figure 10 that this loss would be much higher. In fact, we might assume that 
such CDO contract would have to be terminated before our valuation date. The reason is that 
we did not fully included others risks such as liquidity risk and market sentiment (despite that 
these factors are partly included in the hazard rate).  
The outcomes of our model using the expected cash-flows are alarming. The premium 
on the most senior tranche increased 44 times in the observed period, while the loss on this 
tranche  amounted  26.50% of the notional  amount.  We should mention that  these senior 
tranches usually got the highest possible rating scores  indicating poor risk assessment of 
CDOs from rating agencies. As a consequence, Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected. 
Even though only the equity tranche investors were factually hit by the defaults, all 
tranches were hit indirectly - in form of mark-to-market losses - regardless of their rating. 
Although it is unlikable that more than 18 defaults occurred resulting in hit of the 15-30% 
tranche, its mark-to-market loss remained high between as of 26 February 2009 (Table 3). 
0-3%  3-7%  7-10% 10-15% 15-30%
20.9.2007 Premium 14.69% 4.21% 1.89% 0.88% 0.19%
Premium 121.10% 46.94% 26.52% 17.76% 8.37%
% M-t-M Loss -82.12% -71.28% -57.39% -46.13% -26.59%
M-t-M Loss 8,812,000 7,128,000 5,739,000 4,613,000 2,659,000
TRANCHE   
28.2.2009  Page 17 
Therefore, even if a financial institution (as the CDO investor) intended to hold the tranche 
until maturity, it should report a significant loss in its accounting. 
4.3 Main flaws of the CDO market 
As a consequence of the financial turmoil, financial institutions have suffered from massive 
writedowns (Figure 5). It is worthwhile to note that the absolute majority of these writedowns 
resulted from only seven credit events as of February 2009 (Washington Mutual Inc., Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki). After 
these  credit events numerous downgrades by  rating agencies followed. The agencies 
downgraded the tranches of CDOs whose underlying assets came from any of these seven 
companies (for example, Standard & Poor’s downgraded 791 tranches of CDOs during one 
week in December 2008). As a result, the companies that held positions in these CDOs had to 
be downgraded too  (for instance, AIG, MBIA or Ambac were downgraded due to CDS 
hedging their CDO positions losses). Frequently these companies were also included in CDOs 
and therefore caused  further downgrades and mark-to-market losses.  In consequence, the 
mortgage crisis was no doubt the trigger of the following complex credit crunch. Standard & 
Poors estimated that 3,000 CDO contracts were issued as of October 2008 (Thomson Reuters, 
20081), while 75% of synthetic CDOs sold swaps on Lehman Brothers. Moreover,  376 
contracts included Kaupthing, Glitnir or Landsbanki, 1,500 contracts incorporated 
Washington Mutual and 1,200 contracts encompassed both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In 
Europe, 75% of all CDO deals contained at least one of the 7 defaulted companies, what 
implies that the CDO market lacked real diversification at that time. Non-diversified CDOs’ 
portfolios, low cohesion of international financial markets together with the spiraling out of 
control  of mark-to-market losses and downgrades resulted in disastrous  consequences. In 
Figure 12 we suggest main weaknesses of the CDO market, their effects and lessons that 
should be learnt. 
First, CDO investors did not undertake  a  deeper analysis of CDO  underlying assets. 
However, in many cases the volume of outstanding bonds (included as underlying assets of a 
CDO) was much lower than the total volume of this bond included in this CDO. Rating 
agencies should have also reflected  low diversification and the threat of CDO  market 
breakdown after even a few defaults (due to advanced complexity of the CDO market). 
Second, the valuation model comprehension  was often incomplete.  Neither  the basic 
model introduced in Section 3 was comprehended by the investors as they relied on ratings 
and did not care why a bond rated AAA by S&P yielded less than a CDO tranche with the 
same rating. The model introduced by David X. Li is based on many simplifying assumptions. 
Since then papers were written to present more precise valuation models as explained in 
section 3.1., but no one really predicted or warned about the devastating results of an extreme 
case of a series of defaults that followed in 2008 after inclusion of not only a mathematical 
but also a market insight (e.g. the liquidity risk or increased risk aversion of the markets).  
The valuation models are based on future expected cashflows (vs. default probabilities) 
and show the value for investors who hold a CDO to maturity and hence should not be valued 
on  the  mark-to-market  principle. If an investor bought  a senior tranche, even after three 
defaults the chance of being hit was still very low and his cashflow would remain unchanged 
and therefore the basic idea of the model was correct. However, the model did not take into 
account mark-to-market losses. This should have been understood by the majority of investors 
that have to disclose the mark-to-market value of their assets. Stress tests on changing input 
parameters – hazard rate and correlation – in combination with credit events should have been 
run (see above). Last but not least, the resulting losses based on model quotes can be only 
considered as the lower limit of losses, because the market quotes tend to overreact in bad   Page 18 
markets. This complex analysis would lead to a better risk assessment of a CDO and higher 
premiums required from a CDO seller. 
Third, the correlation was obviously mispriced in the model. As explained in Section 4, 
both the implied and base correlations are derived from CDO market quotes. In the previous 
paragraph we argued that the tranches were mispriced and therefore neither the correlation 
value was correct. Only after the market proper valuation of a  CDO the actual value of 
correlation can be derived.  Technically, market participants underestimated the high level of 
correlation among global markets and the speed of the contagion to even unaffected markets, 
leading to a “whiplash” effect among the participants. 
Finally, the mark-to-market valuation principle according to the US law should be 
reconsidered. After the mentioned defaults the CDO market froze and the quotes of tranches 
plummeted. However, all financial institutions still had to value their assets according to these 
market quotes, in spite of their intention to hold CDOs until maturity. As a consequence, this 
obligation has induced multiple losses. In October 2008 the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (often referred to as a bailout of the US financial system) was pronounced in 
the US. Primarily, the Act set apart USD 700 billion for purchase of distressed assets and 
capital injection of the US banks. Additionally, it also allowed in some cases suspending the 
mark-to-market accounting. Instead, the value of a distressed asset can be derived from the 
expected value of cash-flows, i.e. it can be valued according to the model. As discussed in 
section 5.2.2, such valuation would cause huge losses after the default and change of input 
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5.  Conclusion 
The world CDO market has undoubtedly experienced a serious shock since late 2007. 
In this paper we research the main flaws of the CDO market that caused extensive writedowns 
from CDOs for many financial institutions worldwide. We present the One Factor Model 
based on a Gaussian Copula and develop a simple valuation program in VBA/MS Excel, in 
which we run simulations to test five hypothesizes. Based on the results we discovered four 
main deficiencies of the CDO market and make our recommendation for their elimination. 
Specifically, for our modelling we used the CDX index data from 20 September 2007 until 27 
February 2009 and its quotes we appropriately transform into CDO quotes. Next, we run own 
valuation  model  with varying entry parameters to show the sensitivities of all tranches. 
Finally, we compare the model value of tranches before and after the crisis based on changed 
expected cash-flows made by CDO investors. We conclude that this loss constitutes a lower 
bound of real mark-to-market losses incurred by the investors.  
The first identified deficiency was an insufficient analysis of underlying assets by both 
investors and rating agencies. The fact that seven financial institutions that defaulted since 
September to December 2008 were included in 75% of all European synthetic CDOs should 
be alarming. Such a poor diversification has resulted in chain reaction of losses and 
downgrades of institutions and CDO tranches after these few defaults. Therefore, a deeper 
analysis of diversification effects and quality of underlying assets should be implemented in 
the future. Low understanding of the valuation model caused the second deficiency. Since the 
structure and the valuation of a CDO remains quite sophisticated, investors relied on a high 
rating of senior CDO tranches without understanding the main underlying risks. The model 
was usually based only on expected cash-flows when neglecting other factors such mark-to-
market losses or correlation risk. The possibility of mark-to-market losses of the tranches 
should have been included in the pricing. Results of stress-testing of tranches should increase 
the expected premium payments, what should better reflect higher credit risk involved. The 
third deficiency we found was the fact that also correlation was mispriced. Both implied and 
base correlation derives from the market quotes were artificially lowered by improper market 
optimism. Only after a deep understanding of the CDO valuation model the correlation should 
have been  priced correctly.  Finally, as we numerically demonstrated,  the mark-to-market 
valuation obligation for financial institutions should be reviewed and it should be possible to 
back out of it in cases of a frozen market when risk premiums explode. Accordingly, the 
expected cash-flows valuation should be considered, especially if the instrument is held to 
maturity. Otherwise a next set of writedowns and downgrades may be triggered.  
Based on the mentioned recommendations we conclude that the CDO market has a 
chance to be regenerated. However, that was not the case of past couple of years. The future 
CDO market would then be more conscious. The future CDO market would then be more 
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